Psychology Research Article Critique Example
Psychology Research Article Critique Example
Barbarians Ante Portas! Explaining the European Unionâ € ™ s eastward expansion
Introduction
I f we can no longer speak of communism, we no longer talk about Eastern Europe, at least not with a capital â € ~ EA € ™ for the East. Instead, we must have central Europe again, East Central Europe, South-Eastern Europe with a small â € ~ ea € ™ and, above all, individual nations, nations and states. Timothy Garton Ash
The period between 1989 and 1993 was a real roller-coaster ride in Europe's history. First wave of peaceful democratic revolutions in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), somewhat less peaceful them in Romania and Bulgaria. So domino-like Secession of Soviet â € "the Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. Finally â € "the division of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of a bloody ethnic war. Velvet divorce Czechs and Slovaks and Finally â € "reunification of the German republics Largest Diversity minimum time â €" we could say, paraphrasing Milan Kunderaâ € ™ s famous description of Central Europe. The story had suddenly accelerated and refused to enter the pause ever since. In 1999, three of the newly democratized states joined NATO, followed by seven others in 2004. Only 15 years after the story ran onto the roller coaster 10 new members joined the European Union (EU) â € "8 of them was post-communist states. They were followed by two more in 2007. For some, this is a real Cinderella kind of story. From poor, underdeveloped post-totalitarian countries for full members of arguably the most exclusive club of states in the world â € "in 15 years. A well-deserved release â €" from the perspective of neophytes.
           But what does this process and its culmination in 2004 and 2007 looks as seen from the older members? Was the decision to let all these people from â € œfar away countries that we know littleâ € for the benefit of Europe 15? What was behind the decision? Why train accession take so long â € "or perhaps why it was so sudden? Why was the underdeveloped eastern neighbors are not invited into a quarantine-like form of associate membership instead of letting in the exclusive club directly? Why has Western Europe bother at all? These issues seem to be very lively in the old Member States, especially those who had not a chance for a grand public debate on â € œIdea of Europea €.
           I am not able to analyze the problem deeply enough to answer all these questions. My intention is to understand ⠀ "Why the 15 EU members have decided to allow full membership of the 10 former communist countries (1) of Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe? This question is followed by two counterfactual possibilities ⠀ "why were full membership chosen instead of associate membership or denial membership altogether.
           look at this question I will use two leading approaches to European integration: liberal intergovernmental and social constructivism. I will show how the two are able to explain different aspects of the â € œEastern Enlargementâ €, and compliment each other. I will also show why the Eastern Enlargement was a good idea (as opposed to some voices in the old 15 states), both rationally and normatively speaking.
           I will first introduce the two theoretical approaches, before going on to the insights they provide into the process of eastward enlargement.
       Liberal intergovernmental assessed:
The liberal, more scientifically rigorous version Intergovernmental Cooperation ghost was designed by Andrew Moravcsik analyzing â € œmajor step towards European integrationâ € (quoted in: Schimmelfennig 2005: 75). The approach based on the assumed instrumental rationality of actors (states, state delegations in the negotiations), acting in accordance with their preferences (exogenous to the negotiating process established in the domestic political struggle) and try to pursue their goals, but is hampered by actions of other rational state actors (2).
           The accession of 12 new members are given a â € œmajor stepâ €, one would therefore expect Li to be well suited to explain it. This case, however, said to be quite problematic â € "â € œLI only gives a partial explanation for the eastern extension of the EUA € by Frank Schimmelfennig claims (Ibid: 75, 86-92).  He gives a fair account of the ways LI is able to explain how the events unfolded. His main argument is that LI fail to give a plausible enough answer to the question why full membership, rather than a form of association was offered at the post-communist states as early as 1993 (ibid: 90).  Schimmelfennigâ € ™ s reply to this problem is the role of values in shaping actorsâ € ™ preferences, and whatâ € ™ s far more important to strengthen or weaken their bargaining position (I'll get back to the next section).
           There are two arguments for LI, and against Schimmelfennigâ € ™ s point. First â € "the spirit of â € œassociation rather than membershipâ € based more or less explicit assumption that the extension was of low short-term benefit of the old 15th is even depicted as an act of good will or charity on behalf of the wealthy Western Europe. I want to prove that it is not true â € "at least not for all the old EU members. By proving the instrumental rationality behind the decision to allow eastern neighbors to fully participate in the European project, we leave the enlargement process in LIA € ™ s domain of application, or â € œhome turfâ € (Caporaso, Checkel and Jupiler 2003). Another argument is that if we treat the ideational sphere as a factor in actorsâ € ™ interest formation we can use the interest thus created in a purely liberal intergovernmentalist analysis (also Moravcsikâ € ™ s point of criticism of the alleged value constructivism. Compare: Checkel and Moravcsik 2001).
           I will show that there are two ways the old 15 benefited directly from  accession of CEE countries.
       Social constructivism: the necessary values
The constructivist approach (3), an example is Schimmelfennigâ € ™ s said requirements cited work in its moderate forms, which will be presented here emphasizes the role of social interactions in the process to Europeanisation (Checkel 1999; Checkel and Moravcsik 2001: 220). In various processes, argue and negotiate, they are actors, are said to engage in deeper and thicker exchange of ideas, which in turn is supposed to lead them to reformulate their preferences and rethinking their interests. The process of socialization that takes place within the supranational institutions and the European intergovernmental for a change in how the actors define themselves (identity), the goals they seek and the means to achieve them.
           To make it more concrete, as regards the enlargement eastwards the central problem to be addressed is the post-communist statesâ € ™ â € œextra-Economica € Quality of bargaining power. The 10 countries seemed to have much to offer in exchange for membership (which would be of great benefit to them). I want to challenge this idea completely, but nevertheless, the problem is clear. Schimmelfennigâ € ™ s response is the formation of a society which maintains some values that post-communist states used to gain power in negotiations (2001). I would like to discuss reasonableness of constructivist explanations and confront them with intergovernmentalist one.
        A closer look at case
From LI viewpoint Enlargement should be a rational resolution of the old 15 governments (and society to some extent â € "at the national level of preference formation). Explain the interests of the candidates had to become a member is easy, at least thatâ € ™ s what literature seems to suggest. These are the short-term interests then members are confusing. Actually, I think neither is entirely correct. As mentioned, for the sake of the old 15 was two-fold.
            As for security on short-term benefits are most obvious (in fact Schimmelfennig mention those who â € œgeopolitical interestsâ € [2005: 89]). The countries bordering the new Central European democracies (including Germany) was most interested in their accession â € "seen both as a means of quick discipline and long-term stabilization of the region. Adrian Hyde-Price (2006) goes so far as to call the EU an instrument of â € œcollective hegemonyâ €, used to increase security for members of collective direct and indirect pressure stabilization. It may well explain the old 15a € ™ s one preference in rapid association of newborn democracies and give them a clear signal about the possibility of accession. A signal followed by the first guard, and then more and more strict criteria.
           In economic terms the short-term gains far less obvious. It is true that through the EUA € ™ s structural funds have huge sums of money was transferred east. On the other hand, the growing markets in the CEE no great importance, at least at the time of the Copenhagen criteria. After accession However, we could observe very short-term benefits for the older members. The unexpected result (4)  eastward enlargement and labor market liberalization was the massive migration New member 12 of them courageous enough to open their markets right away. UK and Ireland was flooded by immigrants workforce, but while Greece, Portugal and Spain felt waves reach them. And the impact was (is) â € "surprisingly positive. Irelandâ € ™ s economic boom was hungry for cheap labor. The mythical figure of the â € œPolish plumberâ € to take jobs and benefits of western society proved to be a complete misunderstanding. As the British and Irish authorities comply (Travis 2007, Seaver 2007) CEE immigrants turned out to be not only hard workers but also consumers, increase the domestic markets. Whatâ € ™ s more, it is an intersection of security and economic issues that have a strong focus on the socio-cultural aspects of CEE migration. The new economic migrants are temporary, work-oriented and culturally compatible with Western society. That is, most of the immigrants not intend to settle in host countries (and their host societyâ € ™ s benefit), prefer income from work, often intense, over unemployment benefits and have far fewer problems acquiring. The last factor is especially important now that many Western societies find it hard to assimilate their Muslim immigrant communities, which is a nest of Islamic fundamentalism (5).
           To summarize â € "this indicates that there is a plausible explanation for the eastward enlargement LI can provide. The old 15 states had some strong economic and security interests in allowing the admission of post-communist states â € "both short and long term interests. I believe that full membership is more a symbolic action but even more specifically â € "even could not have occurred if the central European countries were offered a mere associate membership. The economic costs (structural funds) to help the CEE countries would remain the same. Not including them in his decision would make it difficult for any broad social consensus to be reached. Whatâ € ™ s more â € "the vision of accession on the horizon was a big motivation for reforms in the region (Judt 1998: 102). If this target was not clear, however distant in time it was, stability economies and political entities can develop under a number of Yugoslav and Belarussian scenarios.
           It seems that LI have no real problems explaining the fact that the extension, but I still believe other theories can help us understand its shape and speed. Although the old 15 had some important interests in the Middle East, there were only some among many by his interests. Why were the more important, who supplied the Western elites and society with such interpretations of facts, made the Eastern enlargement seems to be a necessity, and why was economically weak CEE countries in a position to win such a strong position in negotiations (flying from London to Nice)? Constructivist analysis has something to say about that.     Â
           In short, the European Union, a community shares certain values â € "liberal and democratic. It has been explicitly designed to federalist ideas of a united Europe, at European cultural, moral and ideational heritage. According Schimmelfennig (2001: 63), members of a society are expected to pursue goals that are consistent with the community ethos is legitimized and empowered by shared values. In its conventional constructivist account, values are simply out there that used the old 15 â € œdriversâ € of the process to shame the â € œbrakemenâ € to accept full membership of the post-communist states. Iver B. Neumannâ € ™ s (1999) interpretive analysis have different starting points â € "it suggests that the central European elites developed their own society discourse aimed at showing: them as a natural part of the West (Judt 1998:42), the European heritage which they share and a Central European identity, which gives countries in the region to cooperate in a peaceful and â € œcivilisedâ € way. In some way central European intellectuals tried to teach Western Europe what it means to be European (Kundera 1984, 2001) and how much in common with the CE states have with their rich EC neighbors. Anyone who wore a touch of bitterness â € "some CE circles reminded the public that Western Europe was partly responsible for the historical accident in central Europe. The words â € œMunich Treasonâ €, â € œSeptember 1939â €, â € œYaltaâ € and â € œMarshall Plana € was used often (Pà ³ k in 2006).
           ⠀ œCentral European Discourseâ € in the Visegrad countries proved to be a successful show a certain  EC / EU, while other less obviously â € œCentral Europeana € geographically, began to use it, and thus stretch imagined region literally â € œfrom Trieste at Adriatica € to, this time, Tallinn on the Baltic country, and even to Sofia on the Black Sea (Neumann 1999). Â
           This proves the important role that refers to the â € œEuropean Identityâ € played in the accession negotiations. I think only association (As a goal, not as a stage prior to accession) was simply not an option was neither a rejection of integration. Apart from the obvious material interests in the old 15 had enlargement, could simply not be legitimate explanation on leaving the CEE states out. Copenhagen criteria, a statement of explicit benchmarks for the candidates, was forced upon the UE such legendary individuals who Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel. EU had refused to allow new states â € "it would lose its legitimacy and the image of a benign community of liberal democracies. On the other hand it would prove to be morally an exclusive, self-interested club Marshall Plan recipients who have forgotten what they owe the rest of the continent and the U.S. for that matter.
        Conclusion: The strong points and shortcomings in the theories
My goal was to use liberal intergovernmental approach and social constructivism to explain the way Eastern Enlargement of the EU was implemented and why it developed in the way it did. I think LI may have more to say about the process than we think. It is not only able to fully explain the negotiations from candidateâ € ™ s page (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002), but when I tried to show that it can give a plausible account of Old 15 preferences and choices.
           LI may explain why full membership was chosen over one or other form of association. Constructivism, on the other side can demonstrate why full membership was the only conceivable option, then members of the EU. I think the way CEE states used references to â € œEuropean Identityâ € and the way this discourse was picked up of â € œdriversâ € of integration between the old 15, is a very useful insight.
           All in all â € "constructivism, but interesting, seems to have a smaller value in the explanation of this case than its proponents think. It appears that much more can be explained on the rationalist framework, while constructivism adds a touch of Weberian Verstehen to reationalist Declared ¤ rung.
          Â
References
 Caporaso, James, Jeffrey Checkel and Joseph Jupiler (2003) â € ~ Integration        Institutions: Rationalism, Constructivism and study of the EU          Introductionâ € ™, Comparative Political Studies 36 (February-March): 70-40.
 Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999) â € ~ Social construction and integrationâ € ™, Journal of European   Public Policy 6 (4): 545-60.
 Checkel, Jeffrey and Andrew Moravcsik (2001) â € ~ A Constructivist Research Program  in EU Studies?  € ™, European Union Politics 2 (2): 219 to 249th
 Hyde-Price, Adrian (2006) â € ~ Normative power Europe: a realist critiqueâ € ™, Journal of      European Public Policy 13 (2): 217-34.
 Judt, Tony (1998) Wielkie Z? Udzenie? Esej o Europie [original title: â € ~ A Grand Illusion?           An Essay on Europea € ™], Warsaw Kraka ³ aw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe OWN.
 Kundera, Milan (1984) â € ~ Zachà ³ d Porwany Tragedia albo Europy? rodkowejâ € ™ [originally published in English under the title: â € ~ A Kidnapped West or tragedy Central Europea € ™], Zeszyty Literackie 5th
 Kundera, Milan (2001) â € ~ Niekochane dziecko rodzinyâ € ™. In: J. Baluch, Hrabal, Kundera,   Havela € | antologia czeskiego eseju, Kraka ³ w: Universitas.
 Moravcsik, Andrew (1998) The choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power       from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
 Moravcsik, Andrew and Milada A. Vachudova (2002) â € ~ bargaining Among Unequal:  Enlargement and the Future of European Integrationâ € ™, EUSA Review 15 (4): 1.3 to 4.
 Neumann, Iver B. (1999) Application of the second. ⠀ The East⠀ in European identity formation,         Manchester: Manchester University Press.
 Pà ³ k, Attila (2006) remapping the Mind: East and West in Post-Communist Eastern    and    Central Europe, reinventing Central Europe. In: http://www.talaljuk-           ki.hu/index.php/article/articleview/734/1/18 / (11/02/2007).
 Schimmelfennig, Frank (2001) â € ~ The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical        Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Unionâ € ™, International           Organization, 55 (1): 47-80.
 Schimmelfennig, Frank (2005) â € ~ Liberal Intergovernmentalismâ € ™. In: anth Vienna and            Thomas Diez (eds) European Integration Theory, Oxford and New York: Oxford University  Press: 75-94.
 Seaver, Michael (2007) â € ~ Ireland Steps Up Immigration as Leaderâ € ™, Christian Science   Monitor, Sept. 5
 Travis, Alan (2007) â € ~ UK better off by immigration, official report showsâ € ™,  Guardian Unlimited, Tuesday, Oct. 16.Â
1st They are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. The â € œ10â € refers to all post-communist newbies, not the 10 states that joined the EU on 1 May 2004th Cyprus and Malta are excluded from the analysis.
2nd It is obviously only a cursory outline of Moravcsikâ € ™ s theory, but should be sufficient for my paper. For a detailed presentation of LI see: Moravcsik 1998th
3rd As in the section disconnect Liberal leadership, I choose not to go deep into the meta-theoretical details on social constructivism, which is covered by this paper is not large enough, and it is not particularly relevant to the argument.
4th Schimmelfennig (2001, 2005) are only talking about trade and investment when he refers to economic interest. This leads him to conclude that CEEâ € ™ s adjacent member states should be more interested in expansion than more distant countries. That is why he is unable to explain the case of the United Kingdom (the argument on conservative â € œeurophobiaâ € [Schimmelfennig 2001: 53] is rather weak) â € "not a neighbor, and away from preaching the European idea. If we include the liberalization of labor into account, Britainâ € ™ s position is very easy to handle.
5.A contrast to most scholars writing about the topic I would rather suggest the negative impact on New 12 (emigration). This is because the very strong brain drain, drain educated and mobile workers to countries where they have positions they are often over qualified. This reduces the apparent unemployment in CEE countries, by reducing the workforce and stop students from ever becoming a member of the workforce in their homeland. Falling unemployment lead to stop any long-term effort against the structural causes of unemployment â € "a socio-economic bomb. The sociological and psychological negative effects of the exodus is also difficult to overlook.Â
About the Author
Researcher in international relations and sociology at the University of Konstanz. Formerly a student at the VU University in Amsterdam, Netherlands, and the Warsaw University, Poland. Previously studied political science and psychology at the University of Oslo, Norway, and the Warsaw School of Social Psychology. Areas of interest include dissidentism, democratic revolutions, politics nad history of central Europe, theories of IR, sociology of social science and football.